There are more and more industries in which firms are specialized in the production of a component of the final good. This is especially true in high-tech industries. The basic question is why don't these firms merge ? We paradoxically show that industries which are typical candidates for composite good industries, are those in which high levels of investments in specialized and component based knowledge are a major source of benefits. In this important case, strictly complementary assets should be separately owned. The basic argument is linked to imperfect competition which changes the ability to extract payoff (power) and the effect of specialized investments on the quality of the composite good. Separate ownership in the case of at least 3 components both powers the individual incentive to invest and is stable with respect to unilateral deviations.
Introduction
There is now a growing class of products with the property that they are only useful if they are combined with other goods. Consumers often purchase a bundle of goods which pools these complementary components and their willingness to pay is based on this bundle rather than on each component. These composite or system goods introduced by Matutes -Regibeau [22] or even, in some sense, by Cournot [8] 1 were largely developed with respect to network economics 2 .
The properties of these peculiar market structures are now quite well-known.
In this paper, we do not present new properties of these industries. We want to tackle the conditions of the existence of separately owned composite good industry. The basic question is why several …rms producing complementary components do not merge ? This question is particularly puzzling if one considers high-tech industries or more generally all industries in which high levels of investments in specialized and component based knowledge are the major source of bene…ts.
To illustrate this point, let us come back to an older by very symptomatic example. In the 80th and more precisely at the beginning of the PCs, one can say roughly speaking that only two …rms operate in this market : IBM which developed the hardware, and Microsoft which provided the MS-Dos operating system. One could of course always argue, in the line of BeckerMurphy [4] , that this situation corresponds to some natural division of labor. But, one must also concede that the pro…tability of this industry largely relies on investments in specialized knowledge realized at each component level. Moreover, these investments in human capital are typically non-contractible and speci…c to each activity. The question that immediately raises in this case is why IBM did not control both activities and why this …rm even powered the development of Microsoft.
If one tries to answer this question, one must ask in fact what are the nature and boundaries of a …rm and therefore enters into the line of research opened by Coase [6] seminal contribution.
But both the transaction cost and the standard market approach surprisingly conclude that this two …rms have an incentive to merge.
The point of view of the transaction cost approach (Williamson [36] [37] [38]) can be sumerized as follows. In the IBM/Microsoft example, as well as in many composite good industries, one notices that one deals with strong relationship-speci…c investments : one …rm develops the 1 In chapter 9, entitled "Du Concours des Producteurs", Cournot introduces, in a very modern way, the case in which two …rms choose prices for products which are complementary from the point of view of the consumer. He largely studies this situation which was latter identi…ed by Sonnenschein [30] as the dual of the standard Cournot model. (For a explicit references to this case see also Economides-Salop [13] or more recently Economides [11] or Colombo-Rossini [7] ). 2 See for instance the special Issue "'Network Economics" of the IJIO [12] in 1996 or Soubeyran [31] and Soubeyran-Stahn [32] 1 hardware, the other the software. These investments makes therefore both …rms strongly interdependent. Moreover, if both actors have in mind that one can perhaps implement the speci…c software on other plat-forms or use other existing software as operating systems without, in both cases, too high costs, one typically identi…es a potential double hold-up problem. But in this case, it is quite di¢cult to understand why these two …rms did not merge.
Of course, one could always argue, as Holmström and Roberts [20] , that the transaction cost approach considers the market as a black box. From that point of view, this approach can only spell out the costs and bene…ts of integration in a manner that relies on the presence of an impersonal market. Put in other words, one could perhaps argue that the existence of composite good industry can be explained by the nature of the competition.
If one simply looks at this new ingredient, one again concludes that both …rms have a strong incentive to merge. On the market, one observes that the consumers are willing to pay a price which takes into account both hardware and software prices, these two prices being set strategically by both …rms. If the pro…ts are higher if they do not merge, one would have an explanation of the existence of composite good industries. Unfortunately, this argument does not work. In fact, this market structure is known since a long time. The case was studied in chapter 9 of Cournot's book [8] and was identi…ed latter (Sonnenschein [30] ) to a Dual Cournot Game (DCG for short). In this chapter, Cournot reports that the …rms in a composite good industry have a strong incentive to merge 3 .
One can however argue that these …rms do not necessarily merge in order to improve their pro…t levels. They can simply …nd an agreement in a bargaining process in which the equilibrium payo¤s of the Dual Cournot Game are used as outside options or statu quo points. Moreover, if one assumes that the relation-speci…c investments are made by the di¤erent parties before the negotiation takes place and are assumed to be non-contractible, one enters in the standard property right approach that was developed by Grossman -Hart [15] , Hart -Moore [17] or Hart [16] . Does this modus operandi explain the IBM/Microsoft puzzle ?
If the two …rms do not merge, i.e. if there is no transfer of property rights that gives for instance to IBM the right to control the market stage, one deals with a situation in which both …rms strategically select their investments ex ante and enter, ex post, into a bargaining process in order to set prices. If both …rms meet ex post, their best common pricing strategy clearly coincides to the one of a monopoly. This decision even leaves some surplus with respect to a situation in which they do not cooperate (i.e. play a DCG). If one assumes as usually in the literature, that the players share this surplus according to the solution of a Nash bargaining game or any kind of strategical mechanism which implement this solution 4 , one observes that 3 This result was also stated by Economides [11] in a model very closed to this one but in which he only concentrates himself on the market structure 4 For a detailed description of the Nash Bargaining solution and the mechanisms which implement this solution, 2 each …rms receives in addition to its the statu quo payo¤ a half of the total net surplus.
Even if one extends Cournot's result to agents with heterogeneous unit constant costs, we prove that the equilibrium pro…ts in a DCG remain the same for both players. But these pro…ts are the statu quo payo¤s in the bargaining process. The Nash sharing rule 5 therefore yields ex post returns for each player which are independent of the statu quo payo¤s. This means that any change in the allocation of the property rights, that modi…es, in the spirit of GrossmanHart [15] , the outside options, does not really a¤ect the ex post returns of each player. Put in an other way, this implies that the ex ante equilibrium choices are independent of the property right allocation and therefore leave the boundaries of the …rm indeterminate. So how can we explain the existence of composite good industries with complementary components ?
This indeterminacy can be reduced by introducing two new ingredients. First of all, it seems quite logical to assume that the …rst best ex post choice, i.e. the monopoly pricing strategy, is a¤ected in a non trivial way by the ex ante investments in specialized knowledge. As Economides
, we consider that these decisions which are made at the level of each component, modify the quality of the composite good. But the components of a composite good are strongly interdependent, it is therefore fairly natural to assume the …nal quality is determined by the lowest level of speci…c investment. This …rst ingredient, as we will see it later, however remains insu¢cient to remove all the indeterminacy. This is why we also introduce some non cooperative behaviors in order to explain the organisation of a composite industry within …rms.
To introduce these non cooperative behaviors, we essentially say that the production of a composite good requires a given set of basic activities to which we initially associate a property right. A …rm is identi…ed to a subset of activities and the structure of the composite good industry is associated to a partition of these basic activities. Firms are therefore coalitions which pool property rights and as legal entity have the right to participate to the ex post bargaining process. The payo¤ generated by this activity must however be redistributed to the initial property right owners. From that point of view, any …rm, i.e. any coalition, has to be stable. This means that no initial property right owner has an incentive to joint an other …rm or to create his own …rm.
More precisely, we consider a subgame perfect equilibrium of a four step game. In the …rst the reader is referred to the book of Osborne -Rubinstein [25] 5 In fact, in the case of monetary returns, these ex post payo¤s are the statu quo pro…ts to which one adds a half of the surplus generated by the negotiation. This surplus, if the statu quo pro…ts are the same, coincides with the monopoly pro…t minus two times the statu quo pro…ts. Hence, the ex post payo¤s are equal to the half of the monopoly returns and are independent of the threat points. 6 From that point of view, our model can be viewed as a generalization to a multi-activity setting of the model of Economides [11] . We however add into this picture some features which are issued from the property right approach. The quality of the composite good is linked to ex ante non contractible investments in knowledge and we introduce an endogenous way to de…ne the number of activities pooled by a …rm. step, each initial property right owner, which is identi…ed to a basic activity, has the ability to pool his right with other players in order to form a …rm. The output of this …rm will be a part of the composite good and is identi…ed to the set of activities pooled together. In this case, each initial property right owner becomes a shareholder of the newly created …rm. This means that he transfers to the …rm the right to sell the product and to set the price of the bundle of components 7 . In return he obtains a part of the pro…t realized by this …rm. After this reallocation of the property rights, each initial owner of a basic activity chooses, as usually in the literature on property rights, a level of investment in specialized knowledge. This investment are measured, as in Hart [16] , in a monetary expenditure which is in …ne largely covered by the pro…t share obtained from the …rm. We assume that these investments are not contractible ex ante 8 . They however largely modify the quality of the composite good. This characteristic, which is given by the lowest quality of the components, is observed in the third step of the game.
In this one, the …rms exercise their residual right to set prices. They however have the ability either to cooperate or to play a DCG. The pro…ts of each …rm are, in any case, shared between its shareholders in the last step of this game. Within this framework, it then becomes essential to verify if our conjectures on the statu quo payo¤s of the bargaining game are true. This implies that we …rst have to study the property of the payo¤s of a DCG independently of the investments in knowledge and the partition of the set of basic activities into …rms. If these payo¤s are the same for each …rm and in aggregate lower than the payo¤ of a monopoly, one can conclude that the …rms have an incentive to cooperate and to share the surplus as it is predicted in a standard cooperative game argument.
If one now has in mind that these pro…ts are also shared within the …rms, it becomes possible to study the ex ante levels of investment in specialized knowledge for any alternative structure of the composite good industry. If this non-cooperative game is solved for any property right allocation, one perfectly knows what an initial property-right owner can expect by joining a coalition (i.e. a …rm).It simply remains to selected the partitions of the set of basic activities which are stable against unilateral deviations and to make sure that these coalitions, as in the standard property right approach, implement an e¢cient solution.
We even go a step further. In fact, we show that if one assumes that the investments in specialized and component based knowledge are the major source of bene…ts, then every initial owner of a basic activity has a strong incentive to create his own …rm. In this case, each initial owner gains by taking part to the price negotiation and this deviation does not modify the incentive to invest of the other players as long as the expected returns are high enough. 7 For some references to price bundling strategies see for instance the book edited by Fuerderer-HerrmannWuebker [14] 8 We assume that the quality or other particulars of a specialized component are not veri…able by an outside party. We take therefore the notion of incomplete contract as granted. For further discussions on this notion see Hart-Moore [18] , Maskin-Tirole [23] , [24] or Segal [29] . 
The model
In order to gain in clarity, we present our model in two steps. We …rst con…ne our attention to the basic set-up and to the description of the di¤erent players. We move, in a second step, to the discussion of the game considered in this paper.
The basic set-up
To illustrate a composite good industry in the simplest way, we introduce a set I = f1; : : : ; Ig of basic activities which are combined in order to obtain a composite or a system good. These activities are sharp complements. This means that the consumption of one unit of the composite good requires a …xed proportion a i of the output of each activity i 2 I. These outputs are realized, for each i 2 I, at an unit cost c i .
Each basic or specialized activity i 2 I is initially owned by an agent who is identi…ed, for simplicity, to the index i of the activity he owns. This agent takes two kinds of decisions.
He can commit himself to merge or to pool his property right over his basic activity with some other agents in order to create a …rm. The job of this newly created …rm, as we will see it in more details later, is to sell the set of components which are pooled together and to cover their production costs. If this happens, each agent looses his residual right to control the price of his own component, but, in return, he receives a part of the pro…t realized by this …rm.
This money can by used by this agent in order to improve his knowledge on the basic activity he realizes. We assume for simplicity that this production of knowledge has constant return to scale with respect to the level e i of monetary expenditure. The improvement is nevertheless bounded from above , i.e. e i 2 [0; ¹ e i ]. As in the literature on incomplete contract, we also assume that the quality or other particulars of a specialized component are not veri…able by an outside party. This investment is therefore non-contractible.
These investments matter for the consumers because they increase the quality q of the composite good. But its components are in fact complements, this is why we assume, as Economides [11] , that only the lowest level of investment in ‡uences the quality. If this index is set to 1 when no e¤ort occurs, we assume throughout this paper that q = 1 + min i2I fe i g.
It now remains to show how the quality in ‡uences the demand. In order to model this fact in a simple way, we consider a discrete choice model characterized by a continuum [0; 1] of consumers. Each of them has an intrinsic valuation x 2 [0; ¹ x] of the composite good. His willingness to pay is however largely in ‡uenced by the level q of quality. If fact, we assume that this willingness to pay is given by 9 q ¢ x. It remains to introduce a cumulative function G(x) which describes the distribution of x across the population. Concerning this function, we assume that its density g(x) is strictly positive and non decreasing i.e. g(x) > 0 and g 0 (x)¸0.
This means that if the price decreases for a given level of quality, or if the quality increases for a given price, there are less and less consumers who decide to enter the market.
Under these assumptions, it is matter of fact to observe that D(
and that this demand is zero for prices which are higher than ¹ p = ¹ x ¢ q. Because the quality index is bounded below by 1, we also assume that
This assumption makes sure that the total unit production cost is always lower than the highest reservation price.
Let us now move to the description of the …rms. Their formation is endogenous. Each …rm f ½ I is simply a subset of activities the property rights of which are pooled together. The set of …rms z = ffg F f=1 therefore describes a partition of the set of basic activities. From that point of view, each …rm is interpreted as an entity producing a composite good which is a sub-component of the …nal good and which is obtained by activating the pooled basic activities. The part of the demand of the composite good served by a …rm f is therefore given by ® f = P i2f a i As a property right holder, each …rm has the right to set the price p f for this composite good.
But this …rm must also cover the production costs of each activity. Its unit production cost 10 is therefore given by c f = P i2f a i ® f ¢ c i where
denotes the part of the contribution of the basic activity i 2 f to the production of one unit of the sub-component realized by f. This activity generates some pro…t which is shared between the initial holders of the pooled activities.
It therefore becomes important to know how the pro…t is shared within each …rm and who manages the …rm.
Concerning this last point, we implicitly assume that one of the agent i 2 f is chosen as the manager of …rm f and that his objective is to maximize the pro…t. This simplifying assumption rules out the complication related to the delegation of authority and to the design of a 9 It now becomes clear for the reader why we decided to normalize the level of quality to 1 in the case in which no investment occurs.
1 0 We do not assume here that there are some additional costs related to the fact that activities must be pooled together. In this paper, we wants to illustrate the idea that …rms has no incentive to merge. Adding such additional costs would simply enforces the argument. With regard to the pro…t sharing rule, we simply assume that the pro…ts are equally shared between the members. A justi…cation of this assumption can be founded in the idea that this money is used by each initial owner of an activity in order to improve his knowledge of his technology and in …ne to improve the quality of …nal good. But the e¤ect of one unit of money invested is the same for everybody. From that point of view, and even if these e¤orts are noncontractible, it seems quite logical to share pro…ts equally. This gives to each agent the same incentive to invest.
The description of the game
In order to summarize the presentation of the model, let us describe the steps of the game that we will study in the rest of this paper (see …gure 1)
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 The managers play
Initial owners play
Strategic property rigth allocation
Strategic choice of the unobsevable e¤orts
Quality is observed
The managers negociate
Dual Cournot Game
Pro…t sharing within the …rms Pro…t sharing within the …rms Figure 1 : The game
Step 1 and 2 are played by the initial owners of the basic activities. In the …rst step …rms are created. This means that we are looking for a partition z = ff g F f=1 of the set of activities i 2 I in a way that no individual i 2 I has an incentive to move from the coalition f to which he belongs. In a second step, the initial owners de…ne their level of investment in specialized knowledge. This decision is assumed to be non-contractible and the monetary costs associated to this decision are …nanced by the pro…t shares obtained in the last step of the game.
Step 3 and 4 are essentially played by the managers of the …rms created in step 1. We assume that these managers observe the quality of the …nal commodity before playing step 3. They …rst have to decide whenever or not they want to negotiate in order to de…ne the price of the subcomponents produced by each one. If the negotiation fails, they play a Dual Cournot Game. In this case, each …rm sets its price p f in a non-cooperative manner. In the other instance, they de…ne a common pricing strategy. If this last alternative is chosen, there is some gain from the cooperation. This means also that there is some money left which has to be shared between the …rms. For that purpose, we suppose that they enter into a Nash Bargaining process in which the statu quo options are given by the equilibrium payo¤s of the Dual Cournot Game. Finally, in step 4, each manager shares the pro…t within the …rm.
If one wants to analyze this game, it now becomes important to study the properties of the equilibrium payo¤s of a DCG. In fact, one has to make sure that the …rms always have an incentive to cooperate independently of the property right allocation and of the investment levels. This study gives us also the threat points of the bargaining process. This is why we dedicate the next section to the analysis of this Dual Cournot Game.
The Dual Cournot Game
If no agrement is reached, each manager f 2 z chooses the price p f of the sub-component he produces by maximizing his pro…t. He however disposes of some informations in order to take this decision. At that step of the game, the property rights are allocated. The set z of …rms is therefore common knowledge. The investments in specialized knowledge are taken as given and the quality q of the composite good is observed. Moreover, if one has in mind that we are in a con…guration in which the negotiation has failed, one can even assume that every manager has the knowledge of the characteristics of the other …rms. Both the contributions ³ (a i ) i2f´f 2z to the composite goods, and the unit costs ³ (c i ) i2f´f 2z are common information.
As a consequence, each …rm chooses a price which solves 8f 2 z p f 2 arg max of prices with the 8 property that :
The study of this game …rst requires some informations on the properties of the demand.
But one knows that the behavior of the consumers is captured by a discrete choice model and that the density of the distribution of the willingness to pay is positive and non decreasing. It
nd it is a matter of fact to observe that : Lemma 1 Under the assumption that g(x) > 0 and g 0 (x)¸0, the demand function D(
Let us now observe that a DCG always exists. In fact, if at least two …rms choose prices with the property that p f > ¹ x ¢ q; the payo¤ of every …rm is zero independently of the choice this …rm could make. Nobody having an incentive to deviate, this is therefore an equilibrium.
But these situations are not very interesting : nobody produces even if there are opportunities to make pro…ts 13 . This is why we restrict the analysis to equilibria in which production occurs.
That can be done by introducing an upper bound on the price sets. An equilibrium
The reader however notices that a Nash equilibrium of this constraint DCG may perhaps lead to a situation in which pro…ts are equal to zero. This situation occurs when p ¤ f hits the boundary of its domain. But Proposition 1 As a consequence of lemma 1, one can assert that if there exists an equilib-
The fact that the demand is concave is directly implied by the assumption that g 0¸0 . The reader however notices that this assumption can be weakened. Log-concavity of the demand is enough to maintain our argument. This property can be obtained by assuming that the elasticity of g is greater than the elasticity of the demand function. 1 3 This directly follows from the fact that even if the quality is low (i.e. q = 1), the highest reservation prices ¹ p = ¹ x ¢ q is assumed to be higher than the total unit production cost.
9
This last result is simply related to the fact that the demand is strictly decreasing up to ¹ x and then becomes zero. It however induces a more interesting property : if an equilibrium exists, it is an interior solution of program (2) . This means that one veri…es for each …rm the following …rst order condition :
as the share of the …nal price that …rm f takes over the …nal demand and if one notes that D(¢); D 0 (¢) and q are independent of the choice of a peculiar …rm f , one must concede that every …rm f 2 z takes the same margin m ¤ over the …nal demand. At equilibrium, every …rm therefore earns the same pro…t although they have di¤erent unit costs.
More formally :
Proposition 2 At equilibrium every …rm f 2 z takes the same margin m ¤ which is implicitly de…ned by :
If this common margin exists and is unique, each …rm earns the same gross pro…t given by :
t remains to make sure that this common margin m ¤ exists and is unique. For that purpose it could be promising to operate a change of variable which is given by :
Equation (3) becomes :
It is therefore su¢cient to show that there exists a unique x which satis…es the preceding equation in order to assert that :
Proposition 3 There exists a unique common margin m
is therefore well de…ned and strictly positive.
4 The e¢cient bargaining solution among …rms
At that point of the analysis, we know what happens if the negotiation fails. It therefore remains to establish that each …rm has a strong incentive to cooperate whatever the property right allocation and the levels of individual investments are. We will even prove that the Nash bargaining process induces, as we have guessed, a solution which is independent, in some sense, of the allocation of the property rights. In fact, we show that the manipulation of the structure of property rights does not a¤ect the payo¤s through changes in the statu quo options. This result is essentially due to the fact that the pro…ts are the same for each …rm if the outside option is played.
So let us …rst verify that the negotiation is pro…table. This is the case when the sum of the pro…ts obtained by each …rm in a DCG is lower than the pro…ts they can obtain by deciding to play together the monopoly price. If one now notices that each …rm realizes the same pro…t at a
given DCG equilibrium and that the case of a monopoly is a particular DCG for which jzj = 1, it simply remains to check that for jzj¸2,
From an intuitive point of view, one remarks that a DCG shares common properties with pricing games in which one observes a phenomena known as "double marginalization". In fact, these games are simply a version of a DCG in which the price choices are sequential. So one can hope that a similar pro…t reducing phenomena is at work and that one can assert that :
The …rms always have an incentive to enter into the bargaining process because jzj ¢ ¼ DCG (q; jzj ; c) < ¼ DCG (q; 1; c).
From that point of view, one can conclude that there is a gain from the negotiation. It however remains to share this surplus. In this paper we do not enter into the bargaining process itself, this is why we adopted, as it is often done in this literature, a normative point of view.
We simply use the Nash Bargaining (NB) solution 14 . It follows that
obtained after negotiation solve :
Moreover one observes that 
The investments in specialized knowledge
At that point of the study, we can now move to the analysis of the ex ante strategical choices of the initial owners of a basic activities. If one has in mind that one seeks for a subgame perfect equilibrium, it is time to examine the equilibrium levels of investments in specialized knowledge.
This decision is motivated by the fact that each agent has the opportunity, for each structure z of the industry, to improve the part of the pro…t he receives from the …rm he decided to joint. If one remembers that the pro…ts are shared equally within each …rm in order to give to everybody the same incentive to invest, and if one denotes by f i the …rm to which i belongs, the pro…t of agent i net of his investment in specialized knowledge is given by :
If one also has in mind that the quality of the …nal good is related to the lowest level of investment i.e. q = 1 +min i2I fe i g, each agent has a strong incentive to choose the same level of investment as the other players. If he does not act in this way he looses money. The question is now how we can identify this common level e z of investment. For that purpose, it becomes important to know the e¤ect of a change in the quality level on the monopoly payo¤.
Proposition 6
One can assert that the monopoly pro…t ¼ m (q; c) is increasing and convex with respect to the level of quality of the …nal good.
This property of convexity, associated to the fact that only the lowest level of investment a¤ects the quality is quite interesting. It tells us, at least from an intuitive point of view, that if at least one agent has no incentive to invest then nobody invests. In the opposite case, one would also expect that everybody invests the largest possible amount of money ¹ e = min i2I f¹ e i g. If one however simply seeks for Nash equilibria of this investment game, one must concede that this intuition is not necessarily true. The lowest level of investment only being taken into consideration, nobody has, in this game, the opportunity to signal that he is willing to invest more even it is better for every body. More formally, one observes that :
¹ e] denote the set of common Nash equilibrium levels of investment and let e min = inf (E F nf0g) (if of course E F nf0g 6 = ;). One observes that (i) e z = 0 is the unique equilibrium if and only if at least one agent has no incentive to invest, or more formally i¤
where q = 1 + e is the quality of the composite good.
(ii) If several equilibria exist, then
(iii) In this last case the set of Nash equilibria is completely Pareto ranked.
From that point of view, it seems quite meaningfull to allow a pre-play communication in order to select a focal equilibrium in the sense of Schelling [28] . This is why we restrict ourself to the undominated Nash equilibria 15 . More precisely, we say that :
are undominated Nash equilibrium levels of investment in speci…c knowledge if and only if :
is a Nash equilibrium i.e. with at least one strict inequality.
Let us now sum up our previous results in order to compute the equilibrium payo¤s of each player. If one denotes by :
the net rate of return of a unit of money invested at the industry level, one remarks by negation of lemma 2(i) that investments occur if every agent is willing to do so, which implies after an 1 5 This selection device in the set of Nash equilibria is rather mild. It is of course possible to use stronger selection devices like the concept of Strong Nash equilibria introduced by Aumann [2] or the notion of coalitionproof Nash equilibria developed by Bernheim -Peleg -Whinston [5] . But this is not necessary. In our case, the set of undominated Nash equilibria coincides to both the strong Nash and the coalition-proof equilibria. 13 algebraic manipulation that 1 + r¸1 n jzj ¢ max f2z fjf jg. The returns must therefore be high enough in order to make sure that investments occur. But this is often the case in knowledge based industries. Moreover because pro…ts are increasing and convex in quality (see proposition 6), the only undominated Nash equilibrium coincides to the highest level of investment. More formally, one observes that :
Proposition 7 According to this selection device, the equilibrium payo¤s of that specialized investment game are for all i 2 I given by :
The structure of the industry
We now move to the basic purpose of that paper : does it make sense to consider composite goods industries ? or more precisely, under which conditions are we sure to observe industries in which complementary assets are separately owned? To answer this question, we will now explicitly make us of the two basic ingredients which are the quality index and the notion of stability against unilateral deviations.
In our model, we put a strong emphasis on the idea that the component based investments in specialized knowledge basically modify the quality of the …nal composite good. We even assumed that this characteristic a¤ects in a non-trivial way the global pro…t opportunities in the whole industry. As a consequence and even if the structure of the property rights do not a¤ect the statu quo points of the bargaining process, this allocation nevertheless matter. It modi…es the individual incentives to invest and therefore the negotiated monopoly solution. This is why, we …rst concentrate our attention onto partitions which are optimal from a global point of view before introducing further re…nements. In other words, let us …rst" in the line of Coase's fundamental insight, looking at the boundary of the …rms through e¢ciency considerations.
But if one remembers that the decision of investment follows a discrete choice model, it becomes important to make sure that there is at least at the aggregated level some incentives to invest. Otherwise the question of the optimal structure of the industry does not really make sense. This is why we assume for the moment that r¸0.
Under this harmless restriction, let us now take, what one can call, the standard point of view of the property right approach. In that case, one would argue that the optimal partitions of the set of basic activities are those which induces a common investment level equal to ¹ e. If one also has in mind (see proposition 7) that investments occurs if and only if 1+r¸1 n ¢jzj¢max f2z fjfjg, one can say that :
The set O of optimal property right allocations which power the incentives to invest is given by :
It is however a matter of fact to observe that the set O can be relatively large, especially if the returns of the investments in specialized knowledge are important. The reader even notices that this set always contains the situation where there is only one …rm as well as the one in which each basic activity is an independent …rm. Some re…nements must therefore be introduced. This is where our second ingredient enters into the story. If one has in mind that each initial owner of an activity takes the decision to pool his property rights with other agents, it seems plausible to seek for industrial structures which are stable against unilaretal deviations. More precisely :
De…nition 5 Let z 2 F be a partition of the set of basic activities and let U i be the subset of partitions obtained by an unilateral deviation of the initial owner of activity i. We say that a partition z ¤ is stable with respect these deviations if and only if :
We denotes this set of stable industrial structures by N .
At that point, the reader may be surprised that the introduction of a non-cooperative argument re…nes a set of cooperative solutions. This is conceivable only if each Nash equilibrium given by de…nition 5 is optimal in the sense of de…nition 4. The intuition beyond this property is quite simple and is related to the fact that the pro…ts are shared two times. In fact, given the incentive e¢cient sharing rule applied within the …rms, one observes that any unilateral deviation from a situation in which nobody invests cannot bring o¤ the investments at the industry level.
From that point of view, the total amount of pro…t to share remains constant. Each agent has therefore an incentive to create his own …rm and to become involved in the pro…t distribution obtained in the bargaining process among …rms instead of earning a share of this pro…t. This means that :
Proposition 8 As long as r¸0, one observes that N ½ O where N denotes the set of Nash equilibria But this result does not really mean that we re…ne the set of optimal industrial structures.
In order to illustrate that point, let us take a structure z of the industry with the property that every initial owner of a basic activity has an incentive to invest and let us assume that there exists at least two …rms f and f 0 satisfying jjfj ¡ jf 0 jj¸2. In this case, an agent who belongs to the biggest coalition always has an incentive to move to the smallest one. This move does not modify the incentives to invest at the industry level, but it improves his own situation : the same amount of pro…t allocated at the …rm level is now shared between a fewer number of agents. If one denotes by I = fz 2 F j8f; f 0 2 z; jjf j ¡ jf 0 jj 1g the set of all partitions with the property that the di¤erence in the number of agents per coalition is smaller than one, one can assert :
The set of Nash equilibria has the property that N ½ O \ I
Finally, if one wants to make sure that the set of Nash equilibria is non-empty, it remains to observe that :
Proposition 10 If r¸0, one can show that the partition ffigg i2I 2 N But this last proposition also means that as long as the global returns of the investments in specialized knowledge are non negative, a situation in which the composite good industry is totally disintegrated is a partition which is both optimal and stable with respect to unilateral deviations 16 Let us now introduce the idea that the investments in specialized knowledge is the key to the pro…tability of the industry. Because we are in a world in with investments either occur or not, one can capture the idea by assuming that the pro…ts at the industry level are largely higher if the investments occur than in the other case. A simple but perhaps extreme way of doing this is to assume that the rate of return r is greater than 1.
In this case, let us now consider a partition of the industry which is di¤erent from ffigg i2I .
This means that several agents have the opportunity to create his own …rm. If there exists for at least one agent a deviation of that kind in which the investment is maintained, this player has an incentive to act in this way. In this case he becomes involved in the pro…t distribution obtained in the bargaining process among …rms instead of earning a share of this pro…t. It may however 1 6 This results is, in some sense, opposed to the one claimed by Hart ([16] p 46). We must however emphasizes that, in our approach, the impact of both the outside options and the private investments are quite di¤erent. Concerning the …rst point, we consider as Holström -Roberts [20] that the hold-up problems are milder in composite good industries : owing one component alone is useless for consumers. This is why we take the Dual Cournot Game as an outside option instead of a comptitive market on which the component can be sold. With regards to the second point, the reader notices that the private investments matter because they improve the quality of the composite good. But this also implies that the payo¤ of each player is therefore not independent of the investments of the other agents.
happen that another agent who belongs to another …rm in the newly created industry structure is no longer willing to invest. Under the assumption that r > 1; this last case can nevertheless be rule out for every partition which belongs to I and therefore includes by proposition 10 the set N of Nash equilibria. This is however not su¢cient to prove that ffigg i2I is the unique stable partition. We also need at least three players to enrich the set of strategies. In the case of two players, it is often the case that one player is the mirror of the other one and induces as it is the case in our paper some indeterminacy. One can therefore assert that :
Proposition 11
In knowledge based composite good industries (r > 1) including at least 3 activities, the only stable industry structure is the one in which each initial owner of a basic activity creates his own …rm. In the case of 2 activities the structure of the industry remains indeterminate.
This surprising result, in case of at least 3 activities, therefore con…rms the intuition of Holström -Roberts ( [20] p 92) as they claimed that "In market networks, interdependencies are more than bilateral, and how one organizes one set of transaction depends on how the other transaction are set up. The game of in ‡uence is a complicated one and leads to strategic consideration that transcend simple two-party relationship."
Conclusion
This last result concludes quite naturally our paper. In fact, our objective was to show that …rms which are specialized in the production of a component of the …nal good do not necessarily merge. This result essentially says that industries which are typical candidates for composite good industries, are those in which high levels of investments in specialized knowledge are a major source of bene…ts.
Our approach basically relied upon the standard view of the boundary of a …rm which involves both incomplete contracts and property rights. We however introduced two new ingredients.
On the one hand, we assumed that the investments in specialized knowledge modi…ed in a non trivial way the nature of the demand through an e¤ect of quality. This implied, with respect to the classical property right approach, that not only the statu quo points but also the …rst best ex post market strategy were a¤ected in a non trivial way by the ex ante decisions of investment. On the other hand, and in order to remove the indeterminacy of the e¢cient property right allocation, we also introduced some non-cooperative behaviors. In fact we said that a property right allocation is stable if and only if no initial property right owner has an incentive to joint an other …rm or to create his own …rm.
Our approach however reminds particular in some respects. First of all, the reader surely noticed that we analyzed the market structure through what we have called a Dual Cournot
Game. This implies that each basic component or group of components produced by a …rm is a bottleneck. There is therefore no competition between the producers of a given component.
The introduction of this new feature would surely modify the conclusions. If fact, if such a competition is introduced in an asymmetric way, it is no more clear that the pro…t equalization rule applies. In this case, one would expect that the statu quo points of the negotiation again matter in the pro…t sharing rule. One also remarks that we have assumed that there are no externalities by pooling activities. The fact that we rule out negative externalities as quite natural with respect to the argument. One could however think at the introduction of positive ones. This would make our argument less extreme. Structures in which some activities are pooled and other not would surely appear. Finally, one could argue that we used a very poor concept of formation of coalitions : the stability with respect to unilateral deviation. This is why it could be interesting to look at the same question by using more demanding notions (see Chwe [9] or Ray -Vohra [27] ) or stability concepts developed in the economy of networks (see Dutta -Mutuswami [10] or Jackson -Wolinsky [21] ).
Finally, we want emphasize that our approach in terms of production network applies to some other situations. For instance, if a leading …rm which assembles the composite good is introduced in this picture, it may be possible to tackle the problem of access to the market and the question of power (i.e. extraction of payo¤) within these industries (see Rajan -Zingales [26] or Stoles -Zwiebel [35] ). This opens the more general question of the manipulation of the set of players in a value chain (i.e. Foreclosure or Dual-Sourcing).Even if no leading …rm is itegrated, one can also adress questions related to mutual adjustments, coordination and competence (see for instance Barney [3] , Soubeyran-Stahn [33] [34]). 
APPENDIX
The proofs which are obvious are not explicitly given.
A Proof of proposition 1
Let us …rst check that the optimal solution to (2) never hits the boundaries of
¢¤
. If the upper bound is reached, then one observes, by the …rst order condition, that :
Moreover one knows, by the viability assumption of the industry, that :
, which is the desired contradiction. As a corollary, one can even assert that, at equilibrium,
0.
Let us now assume that a …rm has an incentive to choose p
But by computation, one obtains that
But we have just noticed that this quantity is at equilibrium strictly positive. It follows that p ¤ f > cf and that the pro…ts are strictly positive. ¥
B Proof of proposition 3
Let us …rst observe that
We can therefore assert that 9x ¤ 2 ]c=q; ¹ x[ with the property that f (x ¤ ) = 0. It remains to verify that f is increasing in order to conclude that x ¤ is unique. By Lemma 1, it is immediate that :
Let us …rst remember that the common margin is obtained by solving equation 5. i.e.
One also observes that the pro…t of the industry can be written as :
If one treats the number of …rms as a continuous variable, one observes that :
If one now applies the Implicit Function Theorem to equation 8, one can say that
< 0. By substitution in equation 9, one obtains after some manipulations that :
It follows that 8 jzj¸2, P(q; jzj ; c) < P(q; 1; c) = ¼ DC G (q; 1; c) ¥
D Proof of proposition 5
If one computes the …rst order conditions associated to program 6, one observes that
Hence each agent earns the same pro…t, although having di¤erent unit costs. ¥
E Proof of proposition 6
With a usual change of variable (see equation 4), one can say that
If one remembers that the solution x ¤ is an interior one, one observes by the standard Envelop Theorem that
It follows that :
But, by the …rst order condition of program 10,
Moreover by Lemma 1 and by the Implicit Function Theorem applied to the …rst order condition of program 10, one obtains that :
One can therefore conclude that :
is strictly convex in the quality of the composite good. ¥
F Proof of Lemma 2
In a preliminary step, let us notice two obvious facts. First of all, this game always admits a trivial equilibrium in which everybody plays ei = 0 and secondly if an equilibrium exists it must be a symmetric one otherwise there always exists a player who has an incentive to reduce his investment and by doing this improves his situation.
Point (i)
Let us now seek for a necessary and su¢cient condition which ensures that ei = 0 is the unique equilibrium Let us …rst verify that this condition is necessary. If
is true, one observes, because @ q ¼ m > 0; that 9i 2 I with the property that
In this case the best reply of this agent is always to play e i = 0. But if at least one agent plays 0 the best reply of the others is also to play 0. If follows that under condition (11), (e i ) i2I = 0 is the unique equilibrium.
In order to verify that this condition is also su¢cient, let us assume that condition (11) is not satis…ed. In this case, one can construct 8i 2 I a quantity e ¤ i > 0 which does not verify equation (11) and one can de…ne e 
But by construction of e ¤ z , we know that
m (1; c) and one can conclude that
If condition 11 is not ful…lled, it makes sense to suppose that EF nf0g 6 = ; and to de…ne emin = inf (EF nf0g). If emin = ¹ e, the proof is …nished. So let emin < ¹ e and let us take any e ¤ z > emin. It remains to verify that playing e ¤ z is for everybody a best replay. But let us …rst remember that emin, when played by everybody, is a Nash equilibrium, hence 8i 2 I, ¼ m (1 + emin; c) ¡ jzj ¢ jfij ¢ emin¸¼ m (1; c). It remains therefore to apply the same argument 1 7 as in the second part of the proof of point (i) in order to make sure that e ¤ z is a Nash equilibrium Point (iii) If condition 11 is not ful…lled, and if emin = ¹ e, the proof is again …nished. So let emin < ¹ e. If one takes any e and e 0 with the property that e min e < e 0 ¹ e and if one knows that these quantities are symmetric Nash equilibria, it is quite easy, with again the same arguments as those developed in point (i) and (ii),to show that 8e; e 0 2 [e min ; ¹ e] and e < e 0 one has :
One can therefore deduces that these equilibria are all strictly Pareto ranked. ¥
G Proof of proposition 7
By lemma 2 and proposition 6, one knows that there are only two common levels of investment which can be undominated Nash equilibria. Either nobody invests or everybody invest ez = ¹ e. If one has in mind that this second case only occurs if nobody has an incentive to deviate from this strategy, this means that :
But this implies that 1 +r¸1 n ¢ jzj ¢ maxf2z fjfjg and the de…nition of the equilibrium payo¤s follow quite easily. ¥
H Proof of proposition 8
In a preliminary step, let us prove that ffigg i2I 2 arg minz 2F ³ jz j n ¢ maxf2z fjfjg´. In fact, one immediately notices that
Let us now assume that 9z 2 F, with the property that jz j n ¢ max f 2z fjfjg < 1. This means that 8f 2 z, jz j n ¢ jfj < 1. If one sums these quantities over all f 2 z, one obtains that P f2z jz j n ¢ jfj = jzj < 1 which is the desired contradiction. After this preliminary comment, let us assume that proposition 9 is not true. This means that there exists a partition z 2 N and z = 2 O. Because z = 2 O then 1 + r < jz j n ¢ max f2z fjfjg. By our preliminary result, this partition cannot be identi…ed to ffigg i2I . z contains therefore at least one coalition composed of at least two basic activities. If one agent who belongs to this set has an incentive to deviate the proof is …nished because we initially assumed that z 2 N . So let us assume that he deviates and creates his own …rm. If z 0 denotes the partition obtained after this deviation, This player, by proposition 7, receives in the Investment Game (IG) :
By our preliminary remark, we know that z 6 = ffigg i2I , one therefore veri…es that
. If one moreover remembers that r¸0; this implies that Let us assume the contrary. This means that 9z 2 F, z 2 N and z = 2 O \ I. By proposition 9 we know, because z 2 N , that z 2 O and one deduces that z = 2 I. This means that z contains at least one coalition f with the property that 9f 0 2 z; jfj ¡ jf 0 j > 1. So let us assume that one agent i 2 f decides to joint coalition f 0 . This new partition is denotes by z 0 . Because z 2 O, we know that investment takes place under z. This means that 1 + r¸1 n ¢ jzj ¢ max f 2z fjfjg. But after deviation jz 0 j = jzj and max f2z fjfjg¸max f2z 0 fjf jg.
Investment also occurs after deviation. Player i therefore obtains ¼ 
J Proof of proposition 10
Let z 0 = ffigg i2I . One …rst observes that 1 +r¸1 n ¢jz 0 j ¢max f 2z 0 fjfjg = 1, thus investments in knowledge occur and the pro…t of each player is
¡ ¹ e . Now let us assume that at least one agent i 0 has an incentive to deviate from z 0 by playing z i . In this case, he only has the opportunity to form a coalition with another agent. In this case, he either earns
respectively occur or not after deviation. One obviously observes that :
hence agent i0 has no incentive to deviate if the investment is maintained after deviation. Let us now consider the second case. We know that r¸1. It follows that :
. In this case agent i0 has also no incentive to deviate. ¥
K Proof of proposition 11
Before showing this result, let us make to preliminary remarks : If jzj = 1 the result is obvious. One also observes that maxf2z fjfjg¸n jz j because otherwise P f 2z jfj < n. Let us now assume that maxf2z fjfjg¸E ³ n jz j´+ 2 and jzj¸2. In this case, one notes that 9 f0 2 z with the property that jf0j E ³ n jz j´o therwise P f 2z jf j¸jzj ¢ E ³ n jz j´+ jzj + 1 > n. Let us now take fmax 2 arg maxf2z fjfjg ; the largest coalition, one remarks that jfmaxj ¡ jf0j¸2. But this contradict the fact that z 2 I. it follows that maxf2z fjf jg is either equal to E 
By computation one observes that :
From a quick study of g(jzj) on f1; : : : ; ng, one notes that g(jzj) maxfg(1); g(n)g = 2n.
¥
Let us now move to the main proof. So let us assume that 9z 6 = ffigg i2I with the property that z 2 N and let us seek for a contradiction. Because z 2 N , one knows that z 2 I, and this will be useful later. Moreover, because z 6 = ffigg there exists a non-empty set I D of agents who has the possibility to create their own …rm.
Let us assume that one of these agents deviates in that way et let us denote by z i the partition obtained after deviation. One …rst notes that Lemma 3 9i 2 I D , with the property that z i 2 O
Proof
Let us assume that 8i 2 I D , one observes that z i = 2 O and let us seek for a contradiction. One …rst notes by construction of O that this condition induces that :
Moreover by construction of the deviation, one knows that 8i 2 I (i) 8i 2 I , jzij = jzj+1 and (ii) maxf2z i fjfjg = maxf2z fjfnfigjg. This either means that :
² 9i 2 ID such that maxf2z fjfnfigjg = maxf2z fjf jg ¡ 1. Because z 2 I, this implies by remark 1 that k 1 and 9i 2 ID, maxf2z fjf nfigjg E ³ n jz j´. ¥ By the preceding lemma we are now sure that 9i 2 ID, with the property that zi 2 O. In this case, the proof is almost …nished. One simply has to observe that if either (jfij¸2 and jzj > 1) or (jfij > 2 and jzj¸1), then : because jzj + 1 < jzj ¢ jfij. The only case in which this inequality is not satis…ed jfij = 2 and jzj = 1. But this means that n = 2, a case which is considered later. There exists therefore a pro…table deviation from z.
But in this case
Let us …nally consider the case n = 2. By computation one typically observes that 8i = 1; 2, ¼ 
